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greatly increase litigation, then the remedy would not be worth
the treatment.
Conclusions
In the reported cases, the courts have protected the insurer's
freedom to distribute the policy proceeds among multiple claimants and have refused to permit claimants to protect a pro rata
share. Such freedom, however, could be easily abused. The insurer could offer a claimant the choice of accepting what the
company has to offer, or risk exhaustion of the proceeds in settlements with other claimants who will accept the company's
terms. If such a practice were widespread, or if disproportionate distribution were common, perhaps courts or legislatures
should provide claimants with enforceable rights in the proceeds.
However, it is submitted that there is insufficient evidence to
indicate that these practices are commonplace. There are very
few reported cases in which a claimant contests a disproportionate settlement. Further, there are indications that carriers go
to some lengths to distribute the proceeds pro rata, lest claimants be permitted to preserve their shares in court. Moreover,
there is a lack of agitation from text writers 43 or plaintiffs' attorneys to change the present system of free distribution by the
insurer. If the freedom which the companies now enjoy is not
being abused, then allowing claimants enforceable interests in
the proceeds would entitle them to nothing more than they now
receive. Allowing enforceable proration under any plan thus far
suggested would serve needlessly to increase litigation in courts
whose dockets are already overcrowded.
Gerald LeVan

The Role of Subrogation by Operation of Law
and Related Problems in the Insurance Field
Introduction
Subrogation accompanies payment. Payment discharges the
obligation, but the fiction of subrogation operates to continue
the existence of the rights, privileges, and powers of the former
43. Professor Keeton does not suggest commonplace abuse by the insurance
companies. He only suggests that the company's duty to the insured and its
obligations to the claimant be consistent. Id. at 28.
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creditor, the subrogor, in favor of the subrogee. 1 Subrogation
confers upon the subrogee not only the cause of action of the
subrogor, but also any security devices accessory thereto. These
security devices of the reimbursed creditor are not released, but
rather secure the cause of action acquired by the subrogee, now
himself a creditor of the former debtor of the subrogor. Hence,
subrogation is a higher right than the simple, or unsecured,
cause of action which appears to be provided for in France and
in Louisiana for one who pays another's debt pursuant to con2
siderations other than donative intent.
The question of the applicability vel non of subrogation
principles arises only in connection with the discharge by one
person of the obligation of another. Casualty insurers are daily
engaged in indemnifying their policyholders for losses covered
by the policies. In many instances, these policyholders may have
had lawful claims sounding in tort or contract against others.
Hence it is apparent that the subrogation doctrine claims considerable attention in the field of insurance law. The primary
thrust of this Comment is focused upon the role of legal subrogation and related problems in insurance cases, with emphasis
on Louisiana law. However, a brief general analysis of subrogation law, in its civilian setting, is undertaken at the outset.
The desirability of attempting to distinguish subrogation from
somewhat similar concepts in a civilian system is indicated.
Subrogation is distinguishable from assignment in several
respects. Assignment is always conventional,3 whereas subro1. 4 AuBPY ET RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS no 321 (6th ed. 1.946) :
"Subrogation is a juridical fiction, admitted or established by the law . . . by virtue
of which an obligation, extinguished with regard to the original creditor . . . is
regarded as continuing to subsist to the benefit of this third party, who is authorized to avail himself, to the extent he has paid, of the rights and actions of the
old creditor." (Transl. by author.)
2. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1236 (Cachard transl. rev. ed. 1930) ; LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 2134 (1870). Of. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH
TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) nos. 474, 475 (1959).

3. This becomes clear from a reading of Article 2642 and following of the
Louisiana Civil Code. However, Article 2011 of the Code provides: "Not only the
obligation, but the right resulting from a contract relative to immovable property,
passes with the property. Thus the right of servitude in favor of immovable
property, passes with it, and thus also the heir or other acquirer will have the
right to enforce a contract made for the improvement of the property by the person
from whom he acquired it." On the strength of this provision, it has been held
that some obligations owed owners of immovable property pass to the vendees
of that property. Breaux v. Laird, 223 La. 446, 65 So.2d 907 (1953) ; McGuffy
v. Weil, 120 So.2d 358 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960). It is arguable that this is,
in effect, an assignment by operation of law. It seems more proper, however,
to reason that such obligations form part of the quid pro quo of the sale and are
tacitly transferred along with the property purchased as consideration for the
purchase price. Such a transfer, although tacit, would nonetheless be conventional.
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gation may take place by operation of law.4 With every assignment warranty of the existence of the credit assigned is implied,5
but this is not the case with subrogation. Subrogation carries
with it only the limited claim to reimbursement, arising as it
does upon payment to discharge a third person's indebtedness.,
Assignment, on the contrary, is actually the sale or exchange of
a credit, and therefore involves the power to collect in full the
7
credit transmitted.
Subrogation differs from that form of novation which involves substitution of creditors in that novation must be contracted expressly,8 whereas it has been noted that subrogation
may take place by effect of law. Furthermore, one of the
essential juridical effects of subrogation is the acquisition by
the subrogee of whatever security the subrogor possessed. To
the contrary, novation ordinarily operates to extinguish the
security protecting the creditor of the original debt. 9
The Louisiana Civil Code provides that subrogation is either
conventional or legal. 10 Conventional subrogation, as it relates
to insurance law, is contracted at the time of payment by the
insurer to the insured who has suffered a loss." Subrogation
of right, or legal subrogation, takes place under the Code in
several given instances.' 2 Specifically in point is Article 2161 (3)
4. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2159, 2161 (1870).
5. Id. art. 2646; FRENCH CIViL CODE art. 1693 (Cachard transl. rev. ed.
1930).
6. See, e.g., Sun Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 47 So.2d
133 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1950) ; Automobile Ins. Co. v. Barnard, 30 So.2d 142
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1947).
7. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 520(4) (1959).

TRANSLATION

BY

8.LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2190 (1870).
9. Id. art. 2195 et 8eq. See also 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE

ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA

STATE LAW

INSTITUTE)

no.

THE

(AN

1637(3)

(1959).
10. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2159 (1870).
11. Id. art. 2160(1) provides: "The subrogration is conventional: 1. When
the creditor, receiving his payment from a third person, subrogates him in his
rights, actions, privileges, and mortgages against the debtor; this subrogation
must be expressed and made at the same time as the payment." (Emphasis added.)
(In connection with the italicized phrase, it is incidentally noted that Union
Indemnity Co. v. Crow, 127 So. 35 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1930) seems to stand for
the proposition that subrogation made prior to payment is valid provided that
payment is later actually made.)
12. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2161 (1.870) provides: "Subrogation takes place of
right:
"1. For the benefit of him who, being himself a creditor, pays another creditor,
whose claim is preferable to his by reason of his privileges or mortgages.
'"2. For the benefit of the purchaser of any immovable property, who employs
the price of his purchase in paying the creditors, to whom this property was
*mortgaged.

"3. For the benefit of him who, being bound with others, or for others, for
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which allows subrogation of right to one who "being bound with
others, or for others, for the payment of the debt, had an interest
in discharging it."'13
Article 2134 of the Civil Code 14 is likewise important to
the ensuing analysis. It is this article which seems to provide
an unsecured simple cause of action in favor of one who, in his
own name, pays the debt incurred by another. It is suggested
that this provision was intended by the lawmaker to furnish
a cause of action for one discharging another's obligation voluntarily, as a negotiorum gestor. Since the insurer does not make
payment as a volunteer "no way concerned" in the obligation,
but rather as one who is bound to make payment, it should be
granted a higher right by law than that accorded a mere
volunteer, or gestor. It is submitted herein that this higher
right is embodied in the provision of Article 2161(3) of the
Code for subrogation by operation of law in favor of one who is
bound with or for another for the payment of a debt and thus
has an interest in paying it.
Tort Claims
In common law jurisdictions the casualty insurer who has
paid is subrogated to its insured's tort claims whether conventional subrogation is present or not.' 5 This allowance of subrogation has its roots in the equitable doctrine of preventing
unjust enrichment.' Accordingly, in the absence of conventional
the payment of the debt, had an interest in discharging it.
"4. For the benefit of the beneficiary heir, who has paid with his own funds
the debts of the succession." (Emphasis added.)
13. Id. art. 2161(3).
14. Id. art. 2134 provides: "An obligation may be discharged by any person
concerned in it, such as a co-obligor or a surety.
"The obligation may even be discharged by a third person no way concerned
in it, provided that person act in the name and for the discharge of the debtor,
or that, if he act in his own name, he be not subrogated to the rights of the
creditor."
15. 6 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4051 (1942) and numerous cases cited therein.
16. 6 id. § 4054; VANCE, INSURANCE § 134 (2d ed. 1951) ; PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW § 33 (1935). See also King, Subrogation Under otracts Insuring Property, 30 TEXAS L. REV. 62 (1951). The doctrine has been
referred to by one author as "nonconsensual suretyship." Campbell, Non-Consen8wal Suretyship, 45 YALE L.J. 69, 76 (1935) : "An insurer and a tortfeasor whose
wilful, reckless or negligent conduct causes loss to a third person, for which loss
the insurer is bound to indemnify the latter, are in the relation of surety and
principal, although it is obviously not consensual. The reasons are (1) that the
insurer and the tortfeasor are bound, the one by contract and the other because
of his tort, to indemnify the insured for the loss; (2) that, in equity and good
conscience, the insured should but once receive full compensation in his own behalf; and (3) as between the insured and a tortfeasor who is in fault, the latter
should bear the ultimate burden of making compensation for the loss resulting
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subrogation, Anglo-American courts have predicated their find-

ings of subrogation in favor of insurers who have paid upon the
7
conclusion that subrogation takes place by operation of law.'

The Louisiana courts have not arrived at such well-defined
results. The cases involving conventional subrogation appear
to be fairly satisfactory and may be said to stand for the proposition that conventional subrogation is permissible for insurers
and will be supported if adequate proof is adduced that subrogation was made conformably to the pattern prescribed by the
Code.' 8 There is, however, no way to reconcile the cases in
which conventional subrogation was lacking or at issue. Conflicting bases upon which earlier decisions were founded and discordant interpretations of the limits of legal subrogation have
combined to create a state of confusion in our law on the matter.
Some cases have foundered on the tort theory reef, while others
are embattled by diverse pronouncements of subrogation law.
In general, it may be said that the Louisiana jurisprudence

has moved in three directions. Some decisions have held that
Article 2161 provides legal subrogation for a casualty insurer
who has paid. 19 Others hold that there is no legal subrogation in
therefrom. The consequences of this relation of surety and principal are, first,
that the insurer is subrogated in equity to the rights of the insured against the
tortfeasor, even in the absence of the usual provision in the policy to that effect."
17. 6 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 1 4051 (1942), note 1, and
accompanying text.
18. Home Ins. Co. v. Highway Ins. Underwriters, 222 La. 540, 62 So.2d 828
(1953) ; Motors Ins. Corp. v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 52 So.2d 311
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1951) ; Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Fontenot, 11 So.2d 99 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1942).
19. Monteleone v. Royal Ins. Co., 47 La. Ann. 1563, 18 So. 472 (1895) and
Monteleone v. Harding, 50 La. Ann. 1147, 23 So. 990 (1898) (where building
was destroyed by fire and intervenor insurance company which had paid off claim
sought recovery of one-half value of party wall from adjoining co-owner by virtue
of subrogation, the court approved the action which seemed to be based upon legal
subrogation, although the question did not seem greatly at issue); Moncrieff v.
Lacobie, 89 So.2d 471, 475 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956) ("[T]he collision insurer

also may if it chooses bring an independent action for recovery of damages paid
to its insured against the third party tortfeasor by virtue of its legal or conventional subrogation" (Emphasis added.)) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dejean, 167 So.
864 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936) (definitely seems to recognize legal subrogation in
favor of insurer, but found no cause of action in favor of insured and consequently
none in favor of the insurer; point not passed upon on appeal, Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Dejean, 185 La. 1074, 171 So. 450 (1936)). See also Hanton v. New
Orleans & C. R. Light & Power Co., 124 La. 562, 50 So. 544 (1909) ; Duchamp
v. Dantilly, 9 La. Ann. 247 (1854) ("the legal subrogation extends to every case
when a person pays a debt which he has an interest in discharging" (emphasis
added)) ; Travelers Fire Ins. Co. v. Ackel, 29 So.2d 617 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947)
(dictum to effect that subrogation takes place by operation of law in favor of an
insurer who paid) ; Miller v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 12 La. App. 315, 125 So.
150 (Orl. Cir. 1929) (seems to accept legal subrogation in favor of insurers, but
it is difficult to ascertain exact conclusion of the court). Of. Howe v. Frazer,
2 Rob. 424, 426 (La. 1842). This case seems to be a landmark on legal subroga-
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such a case. Finally there are the decisions which, seemingly
oblivious of the subrogation schism, have been pitched on principles of tort law. Of those decisions denying legal subrogation,
the D. R Carroll & Co. case 20 is the citadel to be razed if the
argument for legal subrogation for insurers is to carry the day.
In the Carroll case, a majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court
denied legal subrogation to a fire insurer which had indemnified
its insureds, shippers of cotton, for loss of the cotton by fire in
transit on the defendant carrier's railway. The court disallowed
the insurer's claim of subrogation to its insureds' possible cause
of action against the defendant with the summary statement
that the insurer did only that which it was paid a premium to do
and that the defendant owed no obligation to the insurer. The
dissenting Justice was of the opinion that a clear case of legal
subrogation had been presented.
Although the Carroll case has not been overruled, it is submitted that the force of its precedent has been considerably
lessened. Without alluding to the Carrollcase, several subsequent
tion, generally. The court, discussing the significance of the phrase in Civil Code
Article 2161(3), "bound with others, or for others," observed: "They were . . .
bound for the same debt, which forms a third category, the first being a binding
for another, the second with another, the third for the same debt as another. The
Code has certainly made an express provision for the two first, and the question
is, whether there is an implied one for the third." The court concluded that there
was provision for the third, and it is suggested that an insurer, even under the
least favorable possible characterization of its obligation to indemnify one injured
by the tortious conduct of another, meets the formula for the third category which
the court in Howe found to be within the provision of Article 2161(3). And cf.
Dupuy v. Graeme Spring & Brake Service, Inc., 17 So.2d 490 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1944), in which the court held that there was no cause of action in favor
of the plaintiff where plaintiff had already been paid by the insurer. The case
might be thought to mean that the insurer acquired the plaintiff's cause of action,
but for the fact that the court referred to the obligation as extinguished. By this,
it is possible that the court meant only that the obligation to this particular
party plaintiff was extinguished. This is surely the desirable interpretation to
place upon the usage, for were it the case that the obligation of a wrongdoer is
extinguished by payment by an insurer of the injured party, then the tortfeasor
would indirectly be made the beneficiary of a contract to which he was, by no
stretch of the imagination, a party, thereby unjustly enriching him.
20. D. R. Carroll & Co. v. New Orleans, J. & G. N. R.R., 26 La. Ann. 447
(1874) (holding no legal subrogation for fire insurer who paid off its insureds'
claims to the insureds' possible cause of action against the defendant railroad
company). The only case of recent date which seems in line with the Carroll
decision is Forcum-James Co. v. Duke Transportation Co., 231 La. 953, 93 So.2d
228 (1957), in which the court denied subrogation by operation of law to a contractor who, in fulfillment of its contractual obligation, repaired a bridge damaged
by a tortfeasor. The contractor in this case was in virtually the same position
as is an insurer. It seems that the plaintiff did nothing to substantiate its claim
to legal subrogation, which accounts for the court's summary disposition of the
claim. Cf. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Thomas, 14 La. App. 117,
129 So. 556 (Orl. Cir. 1930) (denying subrogation to fidelity insurer on authority
of the Carroll case) and Bouchon v. Southern Surety Co., 151 La. 503, 91 So.
854 (1922) (no longer the law since 1926 amendment to Workmen's Compensation Act, but disallowing compensation insurer subrogation).
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cases took an opposite course. 21 Moreover, its authority hag been
diminished by the adoption in 1898 by Louisiana of the standard
fire policy which contains provision for subrogation to tort
claims,2 by the inclusion since 1926 of statutory provision for
subrogation of compensation insurers,2 and by the repeated
24
criticism to which the decision has been subjected.
The reasoning underlying the Carroll denial of legal subrogation would seem to be simply that one who is contractually
bound to indemnify another in case of loss is not, as relates to
the similar duty arising in tort of the one causing the loss,
bound with or for the wrongdoer within the meaning of Code
Article 2161(3). However, it is suggested that a persuasive
argument can be made that the insurer is in fact bound with the
tortfeasor, at least in the sense of Howe v. Frazer 5 that the
insurer is bound "for the same debt as another." A discussion
of this suggestion must await consideration of another case of
major importance, one which did not rest upon subrogation
principles, but rather was charted in tort.
The landmark case of London Guarantee & Accident Ins.
Co. 2 6 has been relied upon by all of the Louisiana courts of
21. See note 19 supra.
22. La. Acts 1898, No. 105, art. 3, § 22; now LA. R.S. 22:691 (1950) as
amended.
23. La. Acts 1926, No. 85, § 23(2) ; now LA. R.S. 23:1162 (1950).
24. Smith, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1952-1953
Term-Insurance, 14 LoUIsIANA LAW REVIEW 164 (1953) ; Nabors, Civil Law
Influences Upon the Law of Insurance in Louisiana, 26 TUL. L. REV. 368, 403
(1951) ; Comment, 25 Tut. L. REV. 358, 366 (1951) ; Note, 19 LOuIsIANA LAW
REVIEW 726 (1959).
25. 2 Rob. 424 (La. 1842). The Howe case is important for its decision that
Article 2161(3) includes provision for subrogation in favor of one who is bound
for the same debt as another. The case involved a surety's demand that it be
subrogated to the claims of its principal, whose adverse judgment it had satisfied.
The crucial language of the opinion is quoted. "It is not very clear that the
parties are bound with each other, for they did not bind themselves together. They
were, however, certainly bound for the same debt, which forms a third category,
the first being a binding for another, the second with another, the third for the
same debt as another." Id. at 426.
26. London Guarantee & Accident Ins. Co. v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R.R., 153
La. 287, 95 So. 771 (1923) (citing as authority Foster and Glassell Co. v. Knight
Brothers, 152 La. 596, 93 So. 539 (1922) ; Appalachian Corp. v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co., 151 La. 41, 91 So. 539 (1922).
Although it does not appear that the Supreme Court of Louisiana has had
occasion to review or follow the London case, the courts of appeal, all circuits,
in most instances eschewing other possible considerations, have adopted and expanded the London ruling in a bevy of decisions. McCoy v. State Farm Mutual
Ins. Co., 129 So.2d 66 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) ; Emmco Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 126
So.2d 57 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960) ; Emmco Ins. Co. v. Nola Cabs, Inc., 125 So.2d
207 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1960) ; Pellegrin v. Canal Insurance Co., 111 So.2d 563
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1959) ; American Bankers Ins. Co. v. Costa, 107 So.2d 76 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1958) (court held that a restricted release could not destroy insurer's own cause of action under Civil Code Article 2315), noted in 19 Louisi-
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appeal for the position that an insurer who is obliged by contract to indemnify an injured party for loss caused by another's
tort is likewise injured by the wrongful conduct and therefore

has an action in tort.2 7 This tort action is defined as being independent of the possible cause of action of the injured insured
against the wrongdoer. The difficulty with the London result is
that it runs counter to the general rule that a tortfeasor is not
liable for such loss as it is not "proximately" caused by his
wrong. "Proximate" is an admittedly elusive concept, being in
the main no more than a semantic cloak for judicial policy conclusions as to the limits of liability for sub-standard conduct. Be
that as it may, however, it seems well settled that loss incurred
as a result of contractual commitment is not "proximately"
caused by the tort which was responsible for the damage which
made the contractual obligation exigible. 28 Regardless of what

factors may have militated in favor of the adoption of a rule
AN&ALAW REViEW 726 (1959); Lumber Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Kemp, 102 So.2d

248 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958) ; Lumbermen's Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ruiz, 77 So.2d
84 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954) ; John M. Walton, Inc. v. McManus, 67 So.2d 130
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1953) (here the court erroneously referred to this situation
as subrogation under Article 2315) ; Hansen v. Hickenbotham, 61 So.2d 620 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1952); Smith v. McDonough, 29 So.2d 818 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1947) ; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Standard Casualty & Surety Co., 3
So.2d 463 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Benton, 153 So.
479 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1934) ; Universal Automobile Ins. Co. v. Manisalco, 148
So. 731 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1933) ; Independence Indemnity Co. v. Carmical &
Woodring, 13 La. App. 64 (2d Cir. 1930) ; Fidelity Union Casualty Co. v. Carpenter, 12 La. App. 321 (2d Cir. 1929) ; Southern Surety Co. v. Morgan's L. & T.
R.R. & S.S. Co., 6 La. App. 575 (1st Cir. 1927).
The possibility bears mentioning that the decision in London might have been
precipitated by the Carroll denial of legal subrogation. Faced with the Carroll
decision, yet feeling in sympathy with the insurer's position, it is conceivable that
the London course of action appeared to the then Louisiana Supreme Court
preferable to overrulling Carroll. However, a solution of lesser inequities hardly
seems a desirable alternative to erasing a poor precedent. Of course, whether
this was the fact of the matter or not is purely conjectural. Nevertheless, it is
certain that the court in London carefully skirted its clearly presented opportunity
to rule on the question of subrogation by operation of law under Article 2161.
"It is argued on behalf of appellant that the right of action for reimbursement
of the compensation paid to Williams arises also from article 2161 of the Civil
Code, declaring when subrogation shall take place. Inasmuch as plaintiff has a
right of action, directly, under article 2315 of the Civil Code, there is no occasion
for deciding whether plaintiff might also have a right of action by subrogation
under article 2161 of the Code." London Guarantee & Accident Ins. Co. v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R.R., 153 La. 287, 291, 95 So. 771, 772 (1923).
27. LA. CIVIL CoDE art. 2315 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 30, § 1,
provides in part: "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another
obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."
28. Mr. Justice Holmes in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S.
303, 309 (1927) : "[N]o authority need be cited to show that, as a general rule,
at least, a tort to the person or property of one man does not make the tortfeasor liable to another merely because the injured person was under a contract
with that other ....
The law does not spread its protection so far." Quoted with
approval in Forcum-James Co. v. Duke Transportation Co., 231 La. 953, 962, 93
So.2d 228, 231 (1957).
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contrary to that of London by the courts of other jurisdictions,
the following inequities of the London independent cause of ac-

tion doctrine are evident.29 The most obvious hardship of the
doctrine is that the tortfeasor might be twice mulcted for his
single wrong, whereas the ordinary rule excludes double dam-

ages. 80 In addition, a release given by the injured insured sufficient to bar the action of a subrogee insurers' would not be effective to defeat an insurer's tort suit if the cause were truly
supported by an independent claim. Furthermore, the insurer
bringing its own action would not be barred by defenses which
could be urged against the injured insured, 2 nor would the

insurer be limited to the amount which the injured insured could

have recovered.33 And these or similar pandorian potentialities
have apparently at last come to the attention of the Louisiana
Supreme Court. Although that court has not lately been presented a clear opportunity to overrule the London case, it is
suggested that this might be the action of the court when an
opportunity arises. This suggestion is made on the basis of
rather strong language impugning London in several Supreme
84
Court cases of recent date.
29. See Note, 19 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 726 (1959).
30. The assumption that situations might be presented wherein the tortfeasor
would in fact be required to pay twice is posited on the independent character
of the action accorded the insurer. That is, recovery by the injured insured from
the tortfeasor could not be posed as a bar to recovery by the insurer, who had
likewise paid the insured, if the insurer's cause of action were independent of that
of its insured.
31. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 94 So.2d 92 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1957) ; Travelers Fire Ins. Co. v. Ackel, 29 So.2d 617 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947).
Of. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Gallien, 111 So.2d 571 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1959).
32. This limitation is the rule in subrogee suits. See, e.g., Great American
Ins. Co. v. Hill, 125 So.2d 669 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960) (holding that contributory negligence of subrogor bars recovery by subrogee insurer).
33. As is the case with subrogation. See Northwestern Mut. Fire Assoc. v.
Allain, 226 La. 788, 77 So.2d 395 (1954) ; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Gallien, 111 So.2d 571 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959).
34. In Marquette Casualty Co. v. Brown, 235 La. 245, 250, 103 So.2d 269,
271 (1958), our Supreme Court said, in a footnote: "[W]e take note again of
the decision in London, Guarantee & Accident Ins. Co. v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R.
Co., 153 La. 287, 95 So. 771. . . . In the recent case of Forcum-James Co. v.
Duke Transportation Co., 231 La. 953, 93 So.2d 228, we found the views expressed
in the London, Guarantee & Accident Ins. Co. case to be in discord with the basic
principle of law that a tortfeasor is responsible only for the direct and proximate
results of his acts. We reiterate this resolution." And, in Forcum-James Co. V.
Duke Transportation Co., 231 La. 953, 961-62, 93 So.2d 228, 230-31 (1957), the
court stated: "It is a basic principle of the law that a tortfeasor is responsible
only for the direct and proximate result of his acts and that, where a third person
suffers damage by reason of a contractual obligation to the injured party, such
damage is too remote and indirect to become the subject of a direct action ex
delicto, in the absence of subrogation. . . . This appears to be the general rule,
to which the Supreme Court of the United States has given its stamp of approval. . . . Even the broad language used in Article 2315 of our Code does not
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. It has been submitted that the Carroll refusal of legal subrogation and the London tort theory are both unsound. The Carroll
case seems at odds with the apparent intention of the redactors
of the Civil Code, and to do violence to firmly entrenched unjust
enrichment principles. The decision in London unjustifiably
overreaches a well-defined pale of tort law and leaves in its wake
a welter of potential inequities. It is suggested that the just
and apparently intended solution to the problem lies in a consideration of Articles 21,34 and 2161 (3) of the Louisiana Civil
Code.
Assuming first that London's days may be numbered and
that highly questionable decision soon laid at rest, there will be
two possible approaches to cases in which no conventional subrogation is present. One involves following the Carroll case and
denying legal subrogation to the insurer who has indemnified
its insured. This resolution would bear the equally unhappy
possible turns of events of either unjustly enriching tortfeasors,
or doubly indemnifying the insured, thereby also flying in the
face of the law's low regard for unjust enrichment. The latter
prospect is disturbing for the further reason that, from the point
of view of the tortfeasor who is sued after the injured party has
been indemnified by his insurer, the ordinary rule is that the
measure of compensatory damages is limited to the loss sustained. The alternative approach would be to allow legal subrogation, a choice which would comply with the spirit of Article
2161 of the Code, as well as provide what would seem to be the
most logical and expedient way to untie this Gordian knot in
our law.
Even if legal subrogation be denied insurers who have paid,
justify a departure from the above stated doctrine."

Annexed to the above text

is the following footnote: "And this, notwithstanding the ruling apparently to the
contrary in London, Guarantee & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R. Co., 153
La. 287, 95 So. 771, which was used to buttress the opinions of the Court of
Appeal for the Parish of Orleans in Universal Automobile Ins. Co. v. Manisalco,
148 So. 731 and Hansen v. Hickenbotham, 61 So.2d 620 and that of the First
Circuit in John M. Walton, Inc. v. McManus, 67 So.2d 130." To the same effect
is Board of Com'rs v. New Orleans, 223 La. 199, 209-10, 65 So.2d 313, 316-17
(1953), the following language of the opinion which seems particularly noteworthy: "[D]efense counsel are quite critical of expressions contained in several
decisions (relied on by plaintiff to support the contention that it has an independent right of action) . . . the cases 'being Foster and Glassell Company, Limited
v. Knight Brothers, 152 La. 596, 93 So. 913; London Guarantee and Accident
Insurance Company v. Vicksburg, S. & P1. R. Co., 153 La. 287, 95 So. 771, and
Smith v. McDonough, La. App., Orleans Circuit, 29 So.2d 818 ....
The criticism
is justified. From a single tortious injury . . . there arises but one cause of
action ....
and all damages flowing therefrom, which may include several different
and distinct elements, are recoverable in one and the same suit."
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there is yet a logical remedy for them. Article 2134 would be
drained of its content were it regarded as providing anything
other than that one who discharges another's obligation, acting

in his own name and as a volunteer "no way concerned" in the
matter, has a cause of action for reimbursement against the
debtor.35 The reason this article provides that such a person,
35. Of. note 14 supra. See
Auto. Ins. Co., 97 So.2d 435
on numerous cited authorities
a cause of action.
The French commentators
for the volunteer who, having
in discharging it. This cause
1236, the counterpart of our

also Standard Motor Car Co. v. State Farm Mutual
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1957), in which the court relied
for its holding that Article 2134 does provide such

(AN

BY THE LOUISIANA

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

seem to agree that there is a simple cause of action
no interest in the obligation, acts in his own name
of action is found under French Civil Code Article
Article 2134. In 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE
STATE LAW INSTITUTE)

nos.

474, 475 (1959), it is written: "He who pays the debt of another has, in principle, recourse against the debtor whom he frees. There is no exception to that
rule except in the very rare case where the payment is made 'animo domandi,'
that is, when the third party intends to make a gift to the debtor in freeing him
from his obligation. In this case, and in conformity with his intention, the law
does not give him any recourse. The fact of payment alone for the account of
another gives rise in favor of the person who does so, to a special action, viz.
the 'action de mandat' (action of mandate) or the 'action de gestion d'affaires'
(action of administration of affairs), according to whether the third party has
paid on the invitation of debtor, or whether he acted spontaneously to relieve him
from a menacing creditor (Cass. Civ., 12 Feb. 1929, Gaz. Palais, 16 April)."
"Enfin un tiers quelconque, mgme non intdressd et agissant de son propre grd,
a qualitd pour payer. Le crdancier n'a aucun motif en effet de refuser la prestation qui lui est offerta et il est mdme tenu de l'accepter, e moins qu'il ne s'agisse
de certaines obligations de faire pour lesquelles la considdration de la personne
du ddbiteur est essentielle (confection d'une oeuvre d'art, d'un travail industriel
exigeant une habiletd professionnelle) (art. 1237) (2). Mais le tiers qui paie ne
pent exiger 4 son profit le bdndfice de la subrogation de la part du crdancier (art.
1236); il ne pourra exercer contre le ddbiteur que le recours fondd sur le gestion
d'affaires ou l'enrichissement sans cause (3)."
"Finally any third person whatsoever, although he be not interested and acting
of his own inclination, has the capacity to pay [another's debt]. The creditor
indeed has no reason to refuse the payment which is offered him and he is
bound to accept it, at least where the matter does not involve certain obligations
to do in which the consideration of the physical identity of the debtor is
essential (the making of a work of art, or a skilled undertaking requiring professional qualification) (art. 1237) (2). But the third person who pays the
debt cannot require the benefit of subrogation to the interest of the creditor
(art. 1236) ; he is only able to exercise against the debtor the remedy founded
on administration of affairs [negotiorum gestiol or unjust enrichment (3)."
(Transl. by author.)

7 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITIt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL

FRANQAIS, OBLIGATIONS, n' 1150 (2d ed. 1954). To the same general effect are
the following commentators: 4 AUBRY ET RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS.
§ 316 (5th ed. 1902) ; 2 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, PRtCIS DE DROIT CIVIL n- 321
(13th ed. 1925) ; 5 DEMANTE, CoURs ANALYTIQUE DE CODE CIVIL n 175 (2d ed.
1883) ; 4 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITt DES CONTRATS nO 80 et seq. (1874) ; 4 MARCADk,
EXPLICATION DU CODE CIVIL art. 1236 (7th ed. 1873).
This allowance of a simple cause of action is in keeping with the rule that a
volunteer is never allowed subrogation. "The doctrine of subrogation is not
applied for the mere stranger or volunteer who has paid the debt of another
without any assignment or agreement for subrogation, without being under any
legal obligation to make the payment, and without being compelled to do so for
the preservation of any rights or property of his own." Harford Bank v. Hopper's
Estate, 169 Md. 314, 324, 181 Atl. 751, 755 (1935). The essentials of a claim
to subrogation are that the party claiming it shall have paid the debt; that he was
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presumably acting as a negotiorum gestor36 in managing another's affairs, is not to be allowed subrogation, carrying with
it the additional benefit of any security devices which the
creditor might have possessed, should be clear. Security devices
are ordinarily employed only in connection with contractual
undertakings. When one has seen fit to bind himself and his
property or his surety to another, there is little reason why a
third party, stranger to the transaction, should not be allowed
to perform for the one so bound, so long as the obligation is one,
such as the payment of a sum of money, which could be discharged equally well by one person as by another. However, it is
quite another matter to place the volunteer in a position where
he could, for example, foreclose on a mortgage granted by the
debtor. One who burdens his property to secure a debt may have
counted heavily on the probable leniency or forbearance of the
creditor he has chosen. It would be manifestly unjust to expose
him to the possible ruthlessness of a stranger to whom he had
in no manner bound himself. Thus, the prohibition, in Article
2134, against subrogating a volunteer is the codification of the
lawmaker's purpose to prevent such an eventuality. Yet, even a
volunteer is given a cause of action for reimbursement, because
to do otherwise would be to permit unjust enrichment.
It should be obvious that an insurer does not act as a volunteer when it indemnifies its insured. Therefore, the insurer is
"concerned" in the obligation, or, stated in the terms of Article
2161, the insurer has "an interest in discharging it." Although
it is true that an insurer who makes payment pursuant to a
claim under a casualty insurance policy is discharging its own
not acting as a volunteer, but had a direct interest in discharge of the debt; that
he was secondarily liable for the debt; and that no injustice would be done to
the other party by the allowance of the remedy of subrogation. Hampton Loan
& Exchange Bank v. Lightsey, 155 S.C. 222, 227, 152 S.E. 425, 427 (1930);

Enterprise Bank v. Federal Land Bank, 139 S.C. 397, 404, 138 S.E. 146, 148
(1927). In Louisiana, this prohibition against subrogating a volunteer is codified
in the proviso of Article 2134 of the Code that if the obligation of a third party
is discharged by one no way concerned in it the one discharging it may not be
subrogated, and in the requirement of Article 2161(3) that for legal subrogation
to obtain under its provisions the one claiming it must have had an interest in
discharging the obligation.

36. See LA. CrvIL CODE art. 2295 et 8eq.
of negotiorum gestio is often associated with
render a service to the principal whose affair
not to be an essential of its application. All

(1870). "Although the institution
an act motivated by the desire to
is managed, this motivation is said
that is required is that the gestor

be aware of the fact that he is attending to another's business, in this case the
defendant tortfeasor's obligation to repair the damage . . . and his motive may

be to benefit (a) another or even (b) himself." Standard Motor Car Co. v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 97 So.2d 435, 439, n. 9 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1957). See also Roman and Kernion v. Forstall, 11 La. Ann. 717, 720 (1856).
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contractual obligation, as the injured insured should not then be
able to proceed against the tortfeasor to the extent he has been
indemnified by the insurer, it would seem that the insurer is
also discharging pro tanto the tortfeasor's obligation. The crucial
question then is whether the insurer is, in the language of Article
2161 (3), bound with or for the tortfeasor for the reparation of
the damage. The answer to this question seems clearly affirmative, if the Louisiana courts adhere to the holding of the
Howe case37 that Article 2161 (3) provides legal subrogation for
one who was bound for the sane debt as another and paid that
debt. iSuch an answer seems desirable, for otherwise the insurer
would be equated to the level of the mere volunteer. Moreover,
this solution would accord with that arrived at in all other
American jurisdictions. But, should the courts here decide
against legal subrogation for the insurer, then presumably there
would have been a finding that the insurer was not bound with
or for the tortfeasor within the meaning of Article 2161(3).
As this would necessarily be the determination, and as the tortfeasor's obligation to the injured insured would be discharged to
the extent of payment by the insurer, then there seems no reason
to deny that the insurer's payment, in its own name, constituted
the discharge of the obligation of another by one no way concerned in it within the intendment of Article 2134.38 Hence, the
insurer should have, at least, a cause of action under that provision. Actually, the cause of action under Article 2134 might
prove just as attractive as subrogation under Article 2161 (3).
The only element which elevates the subrogated cause of action,
in order of preferability, over the simple cause of action is that
of succession to the security devices accessory to a cause of
action. And it is difficult to imagine a tort injury claimn protected by a security device.
Contract Claims
In addition to a claim against his insurer, a policyholder
may have a contractual right against a third party to compensation for his loss. In such a situation, the problem arises of
whether the insurer, or the obligor under the collateral contract,
or both, should bear the risk of loss. No comprehensive survey
37. Howe v. Frazer, 2 Rob. 424 (La. 1842).
38. Cf. Standard Motor Car Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 97
So.2d 435 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957), in which the court found such a cause of
action in favor of a garageman who repaired a car which, while in his possession,
was damaged by a negligent tortfeasor.
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of subrogation claims by insurers can be made without allusion
to the collateral contract claim problem. Nonetheless, discussion of this subject must be prefaced by the caveat that results
in this area are, for the most part, unpredictable. Moreover,
owing to a paucity of Louisiana cases dealing with the multifarious problems of collateral contract claims, the answers which
will be given here can only be suggested, not reported.
Given a situation in which one person is contractually bound
to discharge an obligation to another who likewise has a claim
against his insurer for indemnity on the same account, three
choices of the placement of detriment and benefit present themselves.8 9 Either the insured obligee will be allowed a double
recovery, or the obligor of the contract debt may be given the
benefit of the obligee's insurance, or the insurer, upon paying
its insured's claim, may be subrogated to the insured's cause of
action to enforce the collateral contract indebtedness. The more
frequently arising contract claims cases, in which a choice from
the above alternatives must be made, seem to involve contracts
of carriage, mwortgages, and contracts of sale.
As the common carrier is ordinarily absolutely liable for any
loss to the property of its shippers occurring in transit, a shipper who has insured the shipped goods may have two causes of
action upon loss of or damage to the goods in the course of shipment. The question then is whether the insurer should be subrogated upon payment to the shipper's cause of action against
the carrier. The answer seems generally to be in the affirmative,
even in the absence of a stipulation to that effect in the insurance contract.4 0 However, the previously discussed Carroll4I de39. See King, Subrogation Under Contracts Insuring Property, 30 TEXAS L.
REv. 62. 71 (1951).
40. "An insurer of goods lost while in course of transportation by a common
carrier is entitled, after payment of the loss, to recover what he has paid by
suit against the carrier. No right, in the absence of special contract to the contrary, is better established. The legal principles upon which this right rests are
most clearly stated in Hall v. Railroad Cos., 13 Wall. 370, 80 U.S. 370, by Mr.
Justice Strong, who says: 'It is too well settled by the authorities to admit of
question, that, as between a common carrier of goods and an underwriter upon
them, the liability to the owner for their loss or destruction is primarily upon the
carrier, while the liability of the insurer is only secondary. The contract of the

carrier may not be first in order of time, but it is first and principal in ultimate
liability. In respect to the ownership of the goods, and the risk incident thereto,
the owner and the insurer are considered one person, having together the beneficial
right to the indemnity due from the carrier for a breach of his contract, or for
non-performance of his legal duty. Standing thus, as the insurer does. practically
in the position of a surety, stipulating that the goods shall not be lost or injured
in consequence of the peril insured against, whenever he has indemnified the
owner for the loss, he is entitled to all the means of indemnity which the satisfied

owner held against the party primarily liable.

His right rests upon familiar
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cision in Louisiana involved shipper, carrier, and insurer and
flatly denied legal subrogation in a situation where negligence
on the part of the carrier was alleged. Although it has been
suggested that the holding of Carroll is of dubious validity, it
seems doubtful that a Louisiana court would allow the insurer
legal subrogation to its insured shipper's cause of action against
the carrier not at fault. The only reason for doubt that conventional subrogation to such a cause of action would be acceptable
in Louisiana is that the carrier and the insurer are in virtually
the same position with reference to loss of goods in transit. In
fact, the carrier is, loosely speaking, a near insurer itself. In
the absence of fault and in a situation where it may be difficult
to say that either of the risk-bearers is primacrily responsible,
a court might regard the shipper and the insurer as concurrently
liable and therefore allow each of them only the right to enforce

ratable contribution. 42

In mortgage cases, Louisiana 43 and all other jurisdictions
save Massachusetts 44 hold that a policy provision subrogating
the insurer to the mortgagee's cause of action against the mortgagor, where the mortgagee insures solely for his own benefit,
is enforceable. 45 However, where a policy is found to be for the
principles of equity. It is the doctrine of subrogation, dependent not at all upon
privity of contract, but worked out through the right of the creditor or owner.' "
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie & W. Transp. Co., 10 Biss. 18, Fed. Cas. No. 11,112
(1879), aff'd, 117 U.S. 312 (1879).
Cf., e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Payne,

199 Iowa 1008, 203 N.W. 4, 39 A.L.R. 1109 (1925); Willock v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 166 Pa. 184, 30 Atl. 948 (1895) ; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Triplett, 223
S.W. 305 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) ; Home Ins. Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 18
Wash.2d 798, 140 P.2d 507, 147 A.L.R. 849 (1943).
41. D. R. Carroll & Co. v. New Orleans, J. & G. N. R.R., 26 La. Ann. 447
(1874).
42. In connection with this possibly equitable solution, it is noted that a
carrier-insurer contract clause tiff, in which the carrier has attempted to provide
for its receiving the benefit of the shipper's insurance and the insurer has
provided for conventional subrogation and, more recently, a "loan receipt device,"
has provoked more than one writer to suggest that the insurer and the carrier
should be regarded as concurrently liable, each with the right to claim contribution. See, e.g., King, Subrogation Under Contracts Insuring Property, 30 TEXAS
L. REV. 62, 65, 81 (1951) ; Langmaid, Some Recent Subrogation Problems in the
Law of Suretyship and Insurance, 47 H&Av. L. REV. 976, 992 (1934).
43. Capital Building & Loan Ass'n v. Northern Ins. Co., 166 La. 179, 116 So.
843 (1928) City of New York Ins. Co. v. Abraham, 20 So.2d 183 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1944); Federal Union Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 151 So. 107 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1933).
44. King v. State Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 1 (1851).
Cf. PATTERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 302 (2d ed.
1947) to the effect that the King case is of little efficacy in Massachusetts today
as a result of a statutory requirement that a subrogation clause covering the
mortgage situation be inserted in the standard fire policy.
45. E.g., Pacific National Fire Ins. Co. v. Watts, 266 Ala. 606, 97 So.2d 797
(1957) ; Tarrant Land Co. v. Palmetto Fire Ins. Co., 220 Ala. 428, 125 So. 807
(1930) First National Bank v. Springfield Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 104
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benefit of the mortgagor, the insurer is denied subrogation."
On the problem of legal subrogation to an insured mortgagee's
cause of action against the mortgagor, there are no Louisiana
cases in point, and the decisions of the common law courts
having occasion to pass upon the question are at variance.T
Payment by an insurer does relieve the mortgagor of the mortgage indebtedness pro tanto. Assuming then that risk of loss is
on the mortgagor, legal subrogation could fairly be allowed the
insurer, as it stands as a substitute for the security, the mortgaged property. As such, the insurer is not unlike a compensated
surety and is bound for the same debt as the mortgagor, and
thus its situation should fall within Article 2161 (3) of the Code.
If, however, legal subrogation is not allowed, then the simple
cause of action of Article 2134 of the Civil Code should yet provide a mode of obtaining relief for the insurer.
Probably the most troublesome cluster of cases concerning
subrogation to collateral contract claims is that relating to the
contract of sale cases. Such cases ordinarily arise when an insurer claims subrogation to its insured vendor's cause of action
against his vendee, after the insurer has indemnified its policyholder for damage or destruction to the property. Anglo-American jurisdictions are divided. Although some of these jurisdictions have allowed subrogation, 48 the tendency appears to be
to accord to the vendee the benefits of the vendor's insurance. 49
While Louisiana courts have apparently had no occasion to deKan. 278, 178 Pac. 413 (1919) ; Combs v. American Insurance Co., 296 Ky. 535,
177 S.W.2d 881 (1944); Union Assurance Society v. Equitable Trust Co., 127
Tex. 618, 94 S.W.2d 1151 (1936).
46. E.g., Tarrant Land Co. v. Palmetto Fire Ins. Co., 220 Ala. 428, 125 So.
807 (1930) ; Commercial Credit Co. v. Eisenhour, 28 Ariz. 112, 236 Pac. 126, 41
A.L.R. 1274 (1925) ; Pike v. American Alliance Ins. Co., 158 Ga. 686, 124 S.E.
161 (1924); Home Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 48 Kan. 235, 29 Pac. 161 (1892);
Pendleton v. Elliott, 67 Mich. 496, 35 N.W.97 (1887).
47. Legal subrogation found. Young Men's Lyceum of Tarrytown v. National
Ben Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 177 App. Div. 351, 163 N.Y. Supp. 226 (1917).
Contra: Pendleton v. Elliott, 67 Mich. 496, 35 N.W. 97 (1887) ; National Reserve Ins. Co. v. McCrory, 160 S.W.2d 972 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) ; Hall v.
Miller, 268 S.W. 268 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
48. Combs v. American Ins. Co., 296 Ky. 535, 177 S.W.2d 881 (1944) ; Home
Insurance Co. v. Bishop, 140 Me. 72, 34 A.2d 22 (1943); Leavitt v. Canadian
Pac. Ry., 90 Me. 153, 37 Atl. 886 (1897) ; Interstate Ice & Power Corp. v.
United States Fire Ins. Co., 243 N.Y. 95, 152 N.E. 476 (1926) ; Cadillac Auto Co.
v. Fisher, 54 R.I. 264, 172 Atl. 393 (1934).
49. Kaufman v. All Persons, 16 Cal. App. 388, 117 Pac. 586 (1911) ; White
v. Gilman, 138 Cal. 375, 71 Pac. 436 (1903) ; Godfrey v. Alcorn, 215 Ky. 465,
284 S.W. 1094 (1926) ; Skinner & Sons' Co. v. Houghton, 92 Md. 68, 48 Atl. 85
(1900) ; McRae v. McRae, 78 Md. 70, 27 Ati. 1038 (1893) ; Marion v. Walcott,
68 N.J. Eq. 20, 59 At]. 242 (1904) ; Brakhage v. Tracy, 13 S.D. 343, 83 N.W.
363 (1900).
Cf. In re Future Manufacturing Cooperative, 165 F. Supp. 111
(N.D. Cal. 1958).
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cide whether subrogation is permissible in the contract of sale
cases, the decisions have gone both ways on the question of
whether the vendee is to have the benefit of his vendor's insurance. 50 Whereas permitting the proceeds of a vendor's insurance policy to inure to the benefit of the vendee may seen to be
a rational expedient in that it acts as a device to shift the risk
indirectly to a greater number of people so that it may be borne
more tolerably, second thought suggests that the fact that a
particular solution provides a windfall for someone does not
necessarily recommend the soundness of the solution. And allowing one person to benefit from another's insurance contract is
contrary to the unjust enrichment doctrine and the principle
that a casualty or fire insurance contract is a personal contract
of indemnity. As the risk of loss is ordinarily on the vendee
after the sale is completely confected, it seems that it should
be the vendee's responsibility to protect himself from loss. There
seems to be little comipelling reason for encouraging improvidence by allowing a vendee who fails to procure a policy of
insurance to avail himself of his more prudent vendor's insurance contract, absent a stipulation in his favor in the contract
or assignment of the policy prior to loss with the consent of the
insurer. The argument ordinarily asserted for allowing a vendee
to benefit from his vendor's insurance coverage is simply that,
as a policy matter, the insurance should run with the property.5 1
50. See Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Robinson-Slagle Lumber Co., 147 So.
542 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933), allowing the vendee to benefit by the vendor's
insurance by requiring that the fire insurance proceeds be applied to reduce the
balance due on the purchase price. The case of King v. Preston & Hall, 11 La.
Ann. 95 (1856), was distinguished in the Automatic Sprinkler Corp. case on the
basis that in King the vendor who recovered from the insurance company had no
insurable interest in the property at the time of the loss and the "fact that he
collected money to which he was not legally entitled did not give the vendee any
right to it." In the first place, the vendor's privilege or lien is thought to be
sufficient to give rise to an insurable interest in the vendor in some jurisdictions.
White v. Gilman, 138 Cal. 375, 71 Pac. 436 (1903) ; Skinner & Sons' Co. v.
Houghton, 92 Md. 68, 48 Atl. 85 (1900). And, too, leaving aside the issue of
the validity of such devices under the rule prohibiting conditional sales contracts
in Louisiana, it surely seems that the bond for deed agreements frequently employed in Louisiana leave an insurable interest in the vendor. However, pretermitting further inquiry into the accuracy of the court's distinction between the
King case and the one before it in Automatic Sprinkler Corp., it is observed that,
Automatic Sprinkler Corp. to the contrary notwithstanding, the King case is a
Louisiana Supreme Court case which denied the vendee the benefit of his
vendor's insurance policy.
51. This same type of notion crops up in the field of automobile insurance
law, some writers maintaining that the insurance should follow the automobile,
rather than covering some drivers of some automobiles, as detailed in the policy
in question, for the reason that automobile insurance is primarily designed to
protect the public at large. This is obviously subject to question, because certainly
the insured, under a policy of automobile liability insurance, took out the policy
under the compulsion to protect himself from financial vulnerability, should he
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However, a forceful objection to the argument that the insurance
should follow the property lies in the very nature of the personal
contract rule. It is established that the cupidity, carelessness, or
mania of some persons may lead them to destroy their own property. It is immaterial to insurers whether such persons are
brought to this destruction by reasons of lucre, negligence, or
madness. In all such cases, these persons are thought to be undesirable risks. The practice of selecting risks by face to face
transactions between the prospective insureds and the insurers
or their agents is employed as an aid to excluding undesirable
risks from insurance programs. Thus, insurance contracts covering property are personal contracts in the making of which
the physical identity of the person to be insured plays an important part. If the insurance policy runs with the property, this
will mean that there are going to be many insureds about whom
the insurers have no knowledge. This runs counter to the idea
that insurance policies protecting against the risk of property
damage are personal contracts and is the sort of thing which
causes premiums to rise. If the policy factors underlying this
insurance-follows-the-property idea are sufficiently persuasive
to lead legislatures to adopt it, that is another matter. Meanwhile, the courts should abide by the law of contract. The property destroyed belonged legally to the vendee, who still owed
a portion of its price. It seems a non sequitur to say that if the
property suffered destruction, then its owner is no longer indebted for that which he owed on its purchase price. A sounder
approach, it would seem, would be to allow the insurer who has
paid the insured vendor to be subrogated to its insured's right
to the balance due on the purchase price.
Conclusion
In fine, it is suggested that insurers against casualty losses
should be accorded legal subrogation to the tort or contract
claims of their insureds. The insurer is not unlike a surety,
standing, in a manner of speaking, as security to protect against
the risk of loss, and is therefore bound for the debt which it
secures. The equities of the situation favor the insurer's succeeding by subrogation to these claims, for other approaches
lead inevitably into either the brambles of double recovery or
the briers of unjust enrichment. As for the possible objection
ever be legally responsible for damaging another's person or property with his
automobile.
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that if insurers are allowed subrogation by operation of law to
its insureds' collateral causes of action they will be receiving
premiums without furnishing a quid pro quo, its obvious fallacy
is that in many instances the remedy will be hollow and in others
the prosecution of the cause will be costly even if successful.
Finally, should the courts of Louisiana deny subrogation by
operation of law to insurers, the simple cause of action for reimbursement, based on Article 2134 of the Civil Code, is logically
undeniable to insurers, who, in distributing proceeds under
casualty policies, effectively discharge to the extent of payment
obligations for which others were liable.
There is unfortunately no better indication of the future
course of Louisiana jurisprudence than a review of the decisions
already rendered. Such a review has revealed that the problem
of recourse for insurers who have paid has proved sufficiently
troublesome to produce a confusing collection of cases. It has
been submitted that many of these cases are unsound in theory
as well as in result, and that the doctrine of subrogation by
operation of law offers a solution which is not only workable
but is also on solid ground theoretically. There appears to be
a growing disapproval of the tort remedy. As this route was
the only fairly sure way to recovery open to the insurer, possibly
this awareness of its several shortcomings augurs favorably for
the adoption of the suggested approach.
George M. Snellings III

The Louisiana Direct Action Statute
This Comment presents a review and discussion of the Louisiana Direct Action Statute as it relates to modern automobile
liability insurance. The statute will be considered as a measure
designed to afford financial protection both to individuals and to
the public at large in the assertion of claims arising out of automobile accident cases. Primary emphasis will be placed upon the
manner in which the statute implements this purpose by providing ready procedural access to the insurer.
Utility to Injured Party
(1) The purpose of the Direct Action Statute. Automobile
liability insurance contracts commonly contain "no action"

